Methods of Protection against Threat: Incorrect Ballot Filling by Voter in the Remote Electronic Voting System
https://doi.org/10.31854/1813-324X-2023-9-2-128-142
Abstract
A generalized scheme of remote electronic voice based on homomorphic encryption is considered. Two methods of protecting the voting system from the threat from the voter, consisting in incorrect filling of the ballot by the voter, are investigated. Both methods are based on the algorithms of “zero-knowledge proof”. Evaluations of the complexity of calculations in the formation of proof of the correctness of filling in the ballot by the voter and Evaluations of the complexity of verification of the proof by the controlling party are obtained. A comparative analysis of the complexity of the implementation of both methods has shown that the method based on the proof based on the equality of logarithms has less complexity of calculations on the voter's side compared to the method based on the mixing of votes. At the same time, the second method (the method of mixing votes) requires 1.67 times less calculations in the blockchain, which becomes a significant factor in choosing the second method in favor of a large number of voters.
About the Authors
V. YakovlevRussian Federation
St. Petersburg, 193232, Russian Federation
V. Salman
Russian Federation
St. Petersburg, 193232, Russian Federation
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Review
For citations:
Yakovlev V., Salman V. Methods of Protection against Threat: Incorrect Ballot Filling by Voter in the Remote Electronic Voting System. Proceedings of Telecommunication Universities. 2023;9(2):128-142. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.31854/1813-324X-2023-9-2-128-142